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STAYING NEUTRAL: HOW WASHINGTON STATE 
COURTS SHOULD APPROACH NEGLIGENT 
SUPERVISION CLAIMS AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Kelly H. Sheridan 
Abstract: The torts of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention place a duty on 
employers to prevent their employees from using the places, things, or tasks entrusted to 
them to harm foreseeable victims. The negligent employment torts create an independent 
duty under which plaintiffs may pursue an action when suits brought under a vicarious 
liability or breach of fiduciary duty theory would fail. For victims of sexual misconduct by 
religious leaders, negligent supervision claims against religious organizations are a crucial 
means of remedying serious and lasting injuries. Washington state law recognizes negligent 
supervision, and Washington courts have applied it to religious organizations, but these 
claims typically implicate First Amendment religious freedom concerns. A short series of 
Washington appellate cases affirming grants of summary judgment to religious organization 
defendants on First Amendment grounds has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert 
negligent supervision claims against religious entities. This Comment argues that 
Washington courts have granted religious organizations an impermissibly broad level of First 
Amendment protection from claims of negligent supervision, and suggests a more deliberate 
analytical framework for evaluating the constitutionality of such claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite increased public awareness following the child molestation 
scandals that plagued the Catholic Church during the 1990s, incidence of 
sexual misconduct by religious leaders is still shockingly widespread.1 
This misconduct is a prominent problem in American society, and the 
tort of negligent supervision is an essential mechanism both for 
preventing it and for remedying the harm it causes. When individuals 
file negligent supervision suits against religious organizations, state 
courts are forced to navigate a distinct pair of directives: the dual 
                                                     
1. See Executive Summary, Diana R. Garland, The Prevalence of Clergy Sexual Misconduct with 
Adults: A Research Study Executive Summary (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.baylor.edu/clergysexual 
misconduct/index.php?id=67406 (discussing comprehensive 2009 study finding that one in thirty-
three American adult women who go to church regularly has been the victim of a sexual advance by 
her religious leader). Many such cases appear far more egregious than the illicit tryst at issue in 
S.H.C. v. Lu, infra Part IV.C., with some religious leaders molesting legions of vulnerable minors 
and religious organizations engaging in elaborate suppression campaigns. See, e.g., Laurie 
Goodstein, Vatican Declined to Defrock U.S. Priest Who Abused Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, 
at A1. 
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mandates of the First Amendment’s religion clauses and the general 
right of the aggrieved to seek recourse through the court system.2 What 
are courts to do if the elements of a plaintiff’s claim require them to 
make sensitive interpretive judgments about a religion’s doctrine or 
practice? 
In the 1979 case Jones v. Wolf,3 the Supreme Court articulated a 
framework for courts to use when analyzing whether they can adjudicate 
common-law claims against religious organizations without violating the 
First Amendment.4 State courts have applied this framework in a variety 
of ways, including a categorical bar against such claims, a categorical 
allowance of such claims, and a case-by-case inquiry into whether the 
elements of the claims would require interpretation of the relevant 
religious doctrine.5 In the context of common-law negligent supervision 
claims, the Washington State Supreme Court has expressed approval of 
the latter case-by-case inquiry.6 Several recent Washington State Court 
of Appeals decisions, however, have employed broad language in 
rejecting negligent supervision suits on First Amendment grounds, 
creating strong precedent against such claims.7 
This Comment begins in Part I by examining the tort of negligent 
supervision under Washington law. Part II contains a general exposition 
of recent First Amendment jurisprudence, giving special attention to the 
landmark Supreme Court case of Jones v. Wolf. Part III examines the 
various approaches state courts employ in analyzing whether tort claims 
against religious organizations can be permissibly adjudicated within the 
constraints of the First Amendment. Part IV discusses how Washington 
courts have previously handled this issue, and examines in detail two 
recent appellate cases rejecting negligent supervision suits against 
religious organizations on First Amendment grounds. Finally, in Part V, 
this Comment argues that Washington courts should read this line of 
cases narrowly and apply the neutral principles approach articulated in 
Jones v. Wolf when analyzing tort claims against religious organizations. 
                                                     
2. See infra Part II. 
3. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
4. Id. at 604–07. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 729, 985 P.2d 262, 
277 (1999). 
7. See infra Parts IV.B. and C. 
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I. THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION IMPOSES AN 
INDEPENDENT DUTY ON EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT 
EMPLOYEES FROM ENDANGERING OTHERS 
The torts of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention (“negligent 
employment torts”) place an affirmative duty on employers to prevent 
their employees from causing foreseeable harm to third persons using 
the tasks, premises, or instrumentalities entrusted to them.8 This duty 
applies regardless of whether employees are acting within the scope of 
their prescribed duties, which distinguishes negligent employment 
claims from vicarious liability in both concept and application.9 For 
injured parties whose claims would fail under a vicarious liability 
theory, the negligent supervision action is an indispensible means to 
recovery. 
A. Negligent Supervision Imposes a Limited Duty on Employers to 
Prevent Employees from Causing Foreseeable Harm to Third 
Persons 
The negligent employment torts impose a duty on employers to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent employees from harming others, 
even where the employee is acting outside of the scope of employment.10 
Claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention share similar 
elements, and are distinguishable only by the stage of employment in 
which the tortious conduct arises.11 Washington courts did not begin to 
recognize negligent supervision as a cause of action until the latter half 
of the twentieth century,12 and have been hesitant to assign liability to 
the schools, group homes, and medical clinics that are typically the 
                                                     
8. See Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 48, 929 P.2d 420, 425–26 (1997); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965). 
9. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 425–26. 
10. See Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash. App. 285, 294, 827 P.2d 1108, 1113, review denied, 120 Wash. 
2d 1005, 838 P.2d 1142 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)); see also 
Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 51, 929 P.2d at 420 (“The theory of negligent supervision creates a limited 
duty to control an employee for the protection of third parties, even where the employee is acting 
outside the scope of employment.”). 
11. See Peck, 65 Wash. App. at 288, 827 P.2d at 1110 (“The difference between negligent hiring 
and negligent retention is the time at which the employer’s negligence occurs. With negligent 
hiring, it occurs at the time of hiring; with negligent retention, it occurs in the course of 
employment.”). 
12. See, e.g., La Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167, 172, 234 P.2d 893, 896 (1951) (affirming 
employer liability for negligently retaining employee “because the employer antecedently had 
reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 213 (1933))).  
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target of such claims.13 Washington courts, however, have definitively 
acknowledged the viability of these suits as a means of seeking redress 
where other methods of recovering for employee misconduct fail for 
scope of employment or statute of limitations reasons.14 Plaintiffs have 
successfully asserted that religious organizations may be liable under the 
negligent supervision theory,15 but such claims typically evoke strong 
First Amendment defenses.16 
Liability for negligent supervision arises out of the employment 
relationship and is predicated on the employer’s furnishing of places, 
things, or duties later used to commit negligent or intentional wrongs.17 
For an employer to be liable for negligent supervision, the employer 
must know or have reason to know of both (1) its ability to control the 
employee and (2) the necessity of exercising such control to prevent 
harm to third persons.18 Washington courts have interpreted the second 
element to require a showing that the employer knew or had reason to 
know that the particular employee presented a risk of harm to others.19 
Furthermore, the employee must be on the employer’s premises or using 
an employer’s chattel when the harm occurs.20 To establish that the 
employer’s negligence was the proximate cause of their injury, plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that the negligent or intentional act of the employee 
was foreseeable.21 Imposing liability for negligent supervision supports 
the public policy goals of providing a fallback remedy for injured 
                                                     
13. See, e.g., Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 53, 929 P.2d at 428 (rejecting negligent supervision claim 
against nursing home); Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wash. App. 548, 556, 860 P.2d 1054, 1059 
(1993) (refusing to hold medical clinic liable for doctor’s sexual assault); Scott v. Blanchet High 
School, 50 Wash. App. 37, 45, 747 P.2d 1124, 1128 (1987) (refusing to hold school liable for 
negligent supervision of teacher). 
14. See, e.g., Scott, 50 Wash. App. at 44, 747 P.2d at 1128 (“Negligent supervision of an 
employee is a recognized cause of action.”).  
15. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 727, 985 P.2d 262, 
276 (1999). 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash. App. 285, 294, 827 P.2d 1108, 1113, review denied, 120 Wash. 
2d 1005, 838 P.2d 1142 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)). 
18. See id. 
19. Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 52, 929 P.2d 420, 427–28 (1997) 
(“Washington cases have generally interpreted the knowledge element to require a showing of 
knowledge of the dangerous tendencies of the particular employee.”). 
20. See Peck, 65 Wash. App. at 294, 827 P.2d at 1113 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 317 (1965)). 
21. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 51, 929 P.2d at 427. 
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persons and encouraging employers to take affirmative steps to prevent 
the foreseeable torts of their employees.22 
B. The Tort of Negligent Supervision Is Functionally Distinct from 
Other Employment-Related Torts 
Negligent supervision imposes a duty that is “analytically distinct and 
separate”23 from the vicarious liability theory, which imposes liability on 
an employer for the torts of an employee who is acting on the 
employer’s behalf.24 Unlike the agency theory of the common-law 
doctrine of respondeat superior, which requires employers to answer for 
the wrongs of their employees, negligent supervision claims attach 
liability directly to the employer for a breach of the employer’s own 
independent duty of due care.25 Thus, claims of negligent employment 
can be a viable means of redress even when claims against the principal 
tortfeasor do not succeed due to failure of proof or statute of limitations 
restrictions.26 Furthermore, while an employer’s vicarious liability is 
limited to the employee’s actions within the scope of that employee’s 
employment and on the employer’s behalf,27 the scope of employer 
liability under a negligent supervision theory is limited only by the 
foreseeability that the employee presented a risk of harm to others.28 In 
the context of claims based on sexual misconduct, negligent supervision 
is a critical means of recovery because sexual acts typically occur in 
contexts outside of the scope of employment. 
                                                     
22. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1789, 1858 (2004). 
23. Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 426. 
24. Id.  
25. Id. (citing Scott v. Blanchet High School, 50 Wash. App. 37, 45, 747 P.2d 1124, 1128 
(1987)).  
26. See Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wash. 2d 507, 511, 598 P.2d 1358, 1360 (1979) 
(holding that tort claims do not accrue for statute of limitations purposes “until [the defendant] 
discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause 
of action”). Under the discovery rule, if the plaintiff learns of the employer’s knowledge that the 
employee presented a risk of harm after the conduct occurs, they can potentially recover from the 
employer for negligent supervision even after the statute of limitations period for claims against the 
employee has expired; under a vicarious liability theory, claims against the employer expire along 
with claims against the employee. But cf. Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church, 96 Wash. App. 826, 
835, 980 P.2d 809, 814 (1999) (affirming trial court’s ruling that discovery rule did not apply in 
negligent supervision suit against church because plaintiffs had constructive knowledge that 
deacons concealed pastor’s misconduct).    
27. See Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash. App. 274, 277, 600 P.2d 679, 681 (1979).  
28. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 426 (“[T]he scope of employment is not a limit on 
an employer’s liability for a breach of its own duty of care.”). 
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE ALLOWS COURTS TO 
APPLY NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN TORT CASES 
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom represents an 
outer constraint on the ability of federal, state, and local governments to 
pass or enforce laws pertaining to religious exercise. The trajectory of 
the United States Supreme Court’s application of this principle reflects a 
general shift from an early paradigm of separationism to a modern 
paradigm of neutrality.29 This trend is reflected in the Court’s decisions 
in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause contexts. 
The shift from separationism to neutrality is exemplified by the Court’s 
1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf,30 which held that courts may adjudicate 
common-law claims against religious organizations within the confines 
of the First Amendment if those claims can be decided solely on neutral 
principles of law.31 
A. First Amendment Doctrine Predominantly Requires Government 
Neutrality with Respect to Religion 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in 
pertinent part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”32 
Read together, these two clauses provide dual boundaries on government 
action that relates to religion: protection and establishment. Courts 
applying laws that impact religious organizations must walk a “tight 
rope” between these two priorities.33 In order to afford religious bodies 
sufficient autonomy and freedom of belief without contravening the 
constitutional prohibition on established religion, courts interpreting the 
First Amendment have attempted to “preserv[e] doctrinal flexibility and 
recogniz[e] the need for a sensible and realistic application of the 
religion clauses.”34 While the religion clauses refer specifically to 
                                                     
29. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (2002) (describing Establishment Clause doctrine as historically informed 
by the “mutually antagonistic values” of separation and neutrality). 
30. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
31. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602–03. 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
33. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[W]e have been able to chart a course 
that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of 
established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have successfully traversed.” (quoting Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970))). 
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actions taken by the federal government, both the first (“Establishment 
Clause”) and second (“Free Exercise Clause”) clauses of the First 
Amendment apply to the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth 
Amendment.35 
1. First Amendment Jurisprudence Has Shifted from Outright 
Separationism to Neutrality 
Application of the two principles of the religion clauses has taken a 
trajectory commonly described as a move from a separationist to a 
neutrality-based conception of the First Amendment.36 Separationism 
evokes the strict “wall of separation between Church & State” 
historically associated with the First Amendment,37 requiring that 
“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can . . . participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”38 
Neutrality, on the other hand, does not presume that incidental 
government involvement in religious matters is illegitimate, as long as 
such involvement is generally applicable and neutral both “between 
religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.”39 While 
the rise of a neutrality-based conception of the religion clauses has 
profoundly affected First Amendment doctrine in several important 
areas,40 it has not completely displaced separationist thinking, and both 
paradigms remain prominent undercurrents throughout Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clause doctrine.41 Separationist thinking remains an 
important force in the contexts of government sponsorship of religious 
                                                     
34. Id. 
35. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (incorporating Establishment 
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating Free Exercise Clause). 
36. See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 29, at 1071–72; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1802 
(“By the turn of the millennium, several of the building blocks in the edifice of Separationism had 
crumbled, and a competing paradigm of Neutrality or evenhandedness between religion and 
secularity had taken center stage.”).  
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html. 
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
39. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
40. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1802–03 (describing the neutrality paradigm’s effect on 
the adjudication of internal church disputes and on the right of religiously oriented speakers to 
access forums of public speech). 
41. See id. at 1803 (“This movement toward Neutrality, though sweeping, has remained 
incomplete.”); see also Gedicks, supra note 29, at 1089 (“[F]or a time it seemed that neutrality 
analysis would wholly displace separation analysis under the Establishment Clause. But complete 
displacement never occurred.”). 
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speech42 and direct government aid to religious organizations.43 But 
Supreme Court cases such as Lemon v. Kurtzman,44 Employment 
Division v. Smith,45 and Jones v. Wolf 46 exemplify a marked departure 
from the separationist regime and signify the Court’s increased 
willingness to interpret the First Amendment’s mandates flexibly in the 
context of generally applicable laws that incidentally affect religious 
organizations.47 Recognizing this modern shift towards neutrality is 
essential to understanding the appropriate role for courts hearing 
common-law claims against religious organizations. 
2. The Establishment Clause Prohibits States from Endorsing or 
Inhibiting Religion in Either Purpose or Effect and from Becoming 
Excessively Entangled with Religion 
The first clause of the First Amendment prohibits government from 
passing laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”48 In addition to 
prohibiting the outright establishment of a state church or state religion, 
the Establishment Clause prohibits the “sponsorship, financial support, 
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,”49 which 
“history shows [the founders] regarded as very important and fraught 
with great dangers.”50 In accord with this separationist principle, the 
Supreme Court has traditionally taken a skeptical view of government 
activity that tends to endorse, favor, or promote religion.51 The Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman introduced the 
                                                     
42. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–10 (2000) (addressing 
school-sponsored student prayer at public school athletic events); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
586–99 (1992) (addressing prayer at public school commencement); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 55–61 (1985) (addressing moments of silence at public schools). 
43. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
46. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
47. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (“It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say that if 
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect 
of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been 
offended.”). 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
49. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).  
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
51. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. Of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government . . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another . . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions . . . .”). 
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rhetoric of neutrality to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, requiring 
only that state and federal laws have a secular legislative purpose, a 
“principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,”52 
and that they not foster “an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”53 Determining whether a state’s entanglement with religion is 
excessive requires examination of “the character and purposes of the 
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State 
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the 
religious authority.”54 This nuanced determination depends heavily on 
the factual circumstances and interests involved in the particular case.55 
Though Lemon v. Kurtzman has been criticized by members of the Court 
for its uncertainty,56 its neutrality-oriented analysis continues to provide 
the dominant framework that courts use to determine whether 
government has ventured into religious territory in violation of the First 
Amendment.57 
3. The Free Exercise Clause Prohibits States from Regulating 
Religious Beliefs, but Does Not Prohibit Neutral and Generally 
Applicable Laws That Incidentally Affect Religious Conduct 
The second clause of the First Amendment prohibits government 
from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.58 The Free Exercise 
Clause protects the right to “believe and profess whatever religious 
doctrine one desires,”59 and thus serves to bar “any governmental 
regulation of religious beliefs as such.”60 The Free Exercise Clause also 
                                                     
52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). 
53. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).  
54. Id. at 615. 
55. See id. at 614 (“[T]he line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.”). 
56. See, e.g., Tangipahoa Parish Bd. Of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Like a majority of the Members of this Court, I have 
previously expressed my disapproval of the Lemon test. I would grant certiorari in this case if only 
to take the opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for all.” (internal citations omitted)). 
57. See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–65 
(2005) (applying Lemon analysis in challenge to posting of Ten Commandments in Kentucky 
courtrooms); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669–71 (2002) (applying Lemon analysis in 
challenge to Ohio scholarship program); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1997) (applying 
Lemon framework in Establishment Clause challenge to Title I of New York Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act). 
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
59. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
60. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (emphasis in original). 
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imposes additional limits on government’s ability to enact laws that 
incidentally burden religious conduct.61 The precise extent of these 
limits have fluctuated over time and have historically been the locus of 
prominent Free Exercise disputes.62 
The Supreme Court first examined the issue of state burdens on 
religious conduct in Reynolds v. United States,63 which held that 
territorial governments could constitutionally apply laws against 
polygamy to individuals whose religious beliefs required the practice.64 
The Court reasoned that to permit religious beliefs to trump criminal 
laws “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.”65 Under Reynolds, federal and state 
governments were free to pass laws that incidentally impacted religious 
beliefs and practices, provided that such laws were generally applicable 
and not targeted at a specific religious group.66 
Under the Warren Court’s rights-expanding view of constitutional 
interpretation during the mid-twentieth century, the Court began to take 
a more critical view of government’s ability to create laws impacting 
religion. The noteworthy 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner67 established a 
strict scrutiny approach to laws that negatively affected the exercise of 
religion.68 Under the Sherbert test, laws imposing an incidental burden 
on the free exercise of an individual’s religion are constitutionally 
permissible only if they are “justified by a ‘compelling state interest in 
the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate.’”69 During the decades when the Sherbert test dominated Free 
Exercise Clause jurisprudence,70 it was not enough that a law or 
                                                     
61. See id. at 403. 
62. See generally Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) 
(collecting early Free Exercise Clause cases addressing incidental impacts on religiously motivated 
conduct). 
63. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
64. Id. at 166-67. 
65. Id. at 167. 
66. See id. at 166–67. 
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
68. See id. at 403; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 
(1987) (under Sherbert, state laws burdening religion “must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could 
be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest”). 
69. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); see also 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and 
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). 
70. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873–84 (1990) 
(discussing history and application of the Sherbert test). 
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regulation be facially neutral for it to be constitutionally permissible.71 A 
law could still violate the Free Exercise Clause if the level of adverse 
religious impact it caused outweighed the state’s interest in passing it.72 
The Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith 
rejected the “compelling interest” standard of the Sherbert test, 
embracing instead what is essentially a return to the Reynolds approach 
of refusing to exempt religious exercise from “valid and neutral laws of 
general applicability.”73 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia read the 
Sherbert test as limited to the narrow context of unemployment 
compensation,74 and distinguished cases employing the Sherbert test as 
“hybrid” cases involving additional constitutional rights such as the 
freedom of speech.75 The Smith majority discarded Sherbert’s strict 
scrutiny approach76 and rejected the dissent’s proposal to retain the 
Sherbert test in limited circumstances where the prohibited conduct is 
“central” to the individual’s religion.77 According to the concurrence, the 
Smith decision marked a “dramatic[] depart[ure] from well-settled First 
Amendment jurisprudence” that is “incompatible with our Nation’s 
fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.”78 
                                                     
71. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, 
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens 
the free exercise of religion.” (citing Sherbert , 374 U.S. at 398)). 
72. See id. 
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)); see also id. at 878 (“It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say that if prohibiting 
the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.” 
(emphasis added)). 
74. See id. at 883–84. 
75. Id. at 881–82. 
76. Id. at 884–86. 
77. Id. at 886–87. 
78. Id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In direct response to Smith, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993) (“RFRA”). See City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to our decision in 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.”). Employing language from the 
Sherbert majority opinion, RFRA was a legislative attempt to reinstate the compelling interest test 
for laws incidentally burdening the free exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1)(a) and (b) 
(“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application of the 
burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that . . . interest.”). The attack on RFRA was “quick and decisive.” Trinity Assembly 
of God of Balt. City v. People’s Counsel for Balt. County, 962 A.2d 404, 425 (Md. 2008). Four 
years after Smith, the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to state governments in City of 
Boerne v. Flores. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; see also Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, 
366 F.3d 1214, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[B]y enacting RFRA, Congress had exceeded [its] authority 
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B. Jones v. Wolf Establishes That Courts May Hear Common-Law 
Suits Against Religious Organizations If They Can Be Adjudicated 
Based on Neutral Principles of Law 
While the First Amendment doctrine discussed above involves 
statutory laws that impact religiously grounded conduct, an analogous 
line of First Amendment cases, culminating with the Supreme Court’s 
1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf, addresses the constitutionality of 
common-law suits against religious organizations. In Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,79 the United States Supreme Court 
reviewed a decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court enjoining a 
hierarchical church from defrocking a bishop during the course of a 
protracted internal dispute within the church.80 The Court reversed the 
Illinois court’s detailed review of the church tribunal’s decision on the 
grounds that “[t]o permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the 
allocation of power . . . would violate the First Amendment in much the 
same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.”81 Because 
resolving the ecclesiastical dispute would necessarily require 
interpretation of church doctrine, First Amendment principles prohibited 
the state court’s review of the church tribunal’s decision.82 Serbian 
Orthodox Diocese affirms a broad “ecclesiastical immunity” precluding 
review of internal church disputes,83 and is the source of related 
doctrines like the “ministerial exception” to Title VII sexual harassment 
claims.84 
                                                     
by defining rights instead of simply enforcing them.” (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532) 
(emphasis in original)). RFRA remains valid in application to federal statutes, see Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–34 (2006) (applying RFRA’s 
“compelling interest” standard to Free Exercise challenge to federal Controlled Substances Act), but 
after City of Boerne, state laws that burden religious exercise have been evaluated under Smith’s 
permissive “neutral laws of general applicability” test. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“[A]s 
the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this 
Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”). 
79. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  
80. Id. at 698. 
81. Id. at 709 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 
U.S. 367, 369 (1970)). 
82. Id. (“[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil 
courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts 
shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical 
polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them . . . .” (citing Md. & Va. Churches, 396 
U.S. at 369)). 
83. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726–27 (1871).  
84. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts 
have crafted a ‘ministerial exception’ to Title VII ‘in order to insulate the relationship between a 
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The Supreme Court refined the rule of Serbian Orthodox Diocese 
several years later in Jones v. Wolf. While reaffirming Serbian Orthodox 
Diocese’s mandate that civil courts may not resolve internal church 
disputes by examining religious doctrine and practice, the Jones Court 
held that states were free to apply “neutral principles of law” in 
adjudicating church property disputes.85 Under this neutral principles 
analysis, courts asked to hear common-law claims against religious 
organizations are not required to adopt a “rule of compulsory deference” 
to religious autonomy,86 but can examine church documents such as 
constitutions or trust instruments so long as they “take special care to 
scrutinize the document in purely secular terms.”87 After Jones v. Wolf, 
the First Amendment does not provide religious organizations with a 
blanket defense to lawsuits brought under neutral laws of general 
applicability.88 
The Jones Court’s “neutral principles of law” approach suggests that 
civil courts can permissibly adjudicate religious disputes by adopting 
principles that are “completely secular in operation, and yet flexible 
enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and 
polity.”89 The rise of neutral principles analysis illustrates the general 
shift from separationism to neutrality,90 and parallels the Sherbert-Smith 
shift in Free Exercise Clause doctrine.91 Jones v. Wolf’s general holding 
that courts may apply “neutral principles of law” in adjudicating church 
property disputes remains the dominant framework employed in 
analyzing First Amendment challenges to common-law actions and has 
                                                     
religious organization and its ministers from constitutionally impermissible interference by the 
government.’” (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 
1999))); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Az., 83 F.3d 455, 
467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the ministerial exception survives Smith).  
85. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979). 
86. Id. at 605. 
87. Id. at 604. 
88. See id. at 606 (“The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of 
religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law . . . .”). 
89. Id. at 603. The term “neutral principles of law” was coined by Herbert Wechsler in his 1959 
Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Though Professor Wechsler’s view was premised 
on the anachronistic view that  Article III’s jurisdictional grants imposed a mandatory duty on 
courts to hear certain claims, it has continued to be extremely influential in both the derivation and 
application of constitutional principles. See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (discussing the influence and application of 
Wechsler’s neutral principles concept). 
90. See supra Part II.A.i.  
91. See supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text. 
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permitted courts to hear negligent supervision claims against religious 
organizations.92 
III. STATE COURTS APPLY THREE DISTINCT APPROACHES 
TO FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO NEGLIGENT 
SUPERVISION CLAIMS 
The tension between the ecclesiastical immunity doctrine of Serbian 
Orthodox Diocese and the neutral principles analysis of Jones v. Wolf 
represents the major First Amendment conflict for courts hearing 
negligent supervision claims against religious organizations.93 Because 
the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the 
First Amendment protects religious organizations from tort liability 
when a religious leader engages in sexual misconduct towards a third 
person,94 state courts attempting to reconcile these conflicting 
approaches in the context of negligent supervision claims have reached a 
variety of outcomes.95 
                                                     
92. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (applying Jones v. 
Wolf analysis in negligent supervision claim against Colorado church); see also Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. 
Supp. 1375, 1431–32 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (applying neutral principles analysis in negligent 
supervision claim against Iowa diocese); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995) (applying neutral principles analysis in negligent supervision claim against Michigan 
and Wisconsin churches). 
93. See supra Part II.B. While states are constitutionally permitted to provide differing levels of 
rights and protections in their own constitutions, the First Amendment represents an outer limit on 
state governments’ ability to create laws “respecting” religion. See, e.g., Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 
637, 639 (1983) (per curiam) (Burger, J., concurring) (“With our dual system of state and federal 
laws, administered by parallel state and federal courts, different standards may arise in various 
areas. But when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution 
requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to 
ensure rational law enforcement.” (emphasis in original)). Furthermore, because the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses impose two competing imperatives, states’ freedom to provide 
differing levels of protection are pinioned by the dual boundaries of protection and establishment. 
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
94. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, 
J., dissenting) (“It is generally acknowledged that this area of First Amendment law is in flux and 
the United States Supreme Court cases offer very limited guidance.”); see also Swanson v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 446–47 (Me. 1997) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that 
negligent supervision claims against religious organizations are “an area of the law in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court cases offer limited guidance and there remains significant doctrinal 
uncertainty”). 
95. See Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“[G]iven the delicate 
balance between religious freedom and the protection of the public safety, there is considerable 
diversity in the judicial analysis employed by the different courts.”); see also Joseph B. Conder, 
Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5TH 
530 (1992) (describing various approaches to religious organization liability for clergy sexual 
misconduct). 
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The simplest approaches to determining whether civil courts may 
entertain negligent supervision claims against religious entities are 
categorical:96 states either recognize a complete bar on such claims or 
adopt a permissive regime allowing all negligent supervision claims to 
reach a jury.97 Courts that find religious organizations categorically 
immune from negligent employment torts justify such a bar in two main 
ways. One group holds that these claims contravene Jones v. Wolf 
because reaching findings on the elements of such claims would 
necessarily require examination of religious doctrine, policy, and 
administration.98 A second group finds these claims would violate the 
Establishment Clause because judicial inquiry would result in state 
endorsement of one model of clergy supervision, excessively entangling 
the court with religion.99 Courts adopting a categorical bar overlook the 
fact that claims against religious organizations are appropriate for 
judicial resolution if they can be resolved on “neutral principles of 
law.”100 Furthermore, such a bar affords religious organizations an over-
inclusive penumbra of immunity from the legitimate claims of 
profoundly injured plaintiffs who often lack any other viable cause of 
action.101 
Conversely, some state courts have categorically rejected any concept 
of First Amendment immunity from generally applicable norms of tort 
law.102 This approach rests on a broad interpretation of the neutral 
principles framework and the premise that religious organizations should 
be treated identically to secular organizations for the purpose of 
                                                     
96. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1850 (“When faced with claims that a religious 
institution has failed to exercise due care in the employment of a religious leader, courts tend to 
proceed on an all-or-nothing basis.”). 
97. See id. at 1849–58 (discussing the “categorical approaches” to the negligent employment torts 
in detail). 
98. See, e.g., Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444 (“To determine the existence of an agency relationship 
based on actual authority, the trial court will most likely have to examine church doctrine governing 
the church’s authority over [the priest].”). 
99. See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (“[J]udicial inquiry into hiring, 
ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model 
for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.” (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 
(1997))). 
100. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1871 & nn.306–28 (discussing the use of “neutral 
principles” of law to guide construction of religious texts).  
101. See id. at 1858 (“At the most basic level, plaintiffs often have experienced profound, lasting 
injuries from sexual molestation, and the religious institution frequently represents the only viable 
source of remedy for the harm they have suffered.”).  
102. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (“Application of a 
secular standard to secular conduct that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution.”); see also 
Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV.13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, at *8–10 (D.N.D. 2001). 
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adjudicating negligent supervision claims.103 Courts that apply this 
approach focus on the distinction between external and internal religious 
disputes highlighted in Serbian Eastern Orthodox,104 and find that 
negligent supervision claims are always “external” disputes appropriate 
for judicial review.105 Like the categorical bar approach, however, this 
approach is problematic.106 By treating requisite elemental inquiries—
such as an organization’s structure—as if they were ordinary questions 
of fact,107 the categorical “no immunity” approach ignores the Supreme 
Court’s evidentiary mandate in Jones v. Wolf.108 Commentators argue 
that this over-inclusive approach both creates incentives for religious 
organizations to reconfigure their internal structure so as to defeat 
liability, and leads to imposition of special ecclesiastical liability by 
juries.109 
Courts that reject these two categorical approaches generally examine 
negligent supervision claims under a more deliberate neutral principles 
analysis, focusing on whether determining the tort’s elements would 
necessarily require interpretation of religious doctrine.110 A prominent 
example of this is the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Malicki v. 
Doe,111 which held that negligence claims against a Florida church were 
not barred because they could be adjudicated through the application of 
neutral principles of tort law.112 Under this “true neutral principles” 
                                                     
103. See Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (justifying adjudication on 
the basis that “[t]he court is simply applying secular standards to secular conduct which is 
permissible under First Amendment standards” (citing Moses, 863 P.2d at 321)). 
104. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
105. See Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.R.I. 1997) (“[A] dispute between church 
officials and third persons who allege that they were seriously injured by the negligence of the 
church officials . . . hardly can be characterized as a dispute involving an internal church matter.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
106. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1856 (describing the role of juries under the categorical 
no-immunity approach as “constitutionally troublesome”). 
107. See, e.g., Enderle, 2001 WL 1820145, at *9 (“[W]hether [the religious leader] was an 
employee of the [religious organization] is a question of fact properly resolved by a jury.”).  
108. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 
1854–56 (discussing the over-inclusive effect of the categorical no-immunity approach). 
109. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1856 (“A legal rule that provides religious 
organizations with no constitutional immunity from liability for negligent employment of clergy 
may thus lead, with some predictable frequency, to the imposition of undeserved liability for failure 
to act as a ‘reasonable religious organization’ should.”). 
110. See id. at 1877–78. 
111. 814 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002). 
112. See id. at 361 (“Through neutral application of principles of tort law, we thus give no greater 
or lesser deference to tortious conduct committed on third parties by religious organizations than we 
do to tortious conduct committed on third parties by non-religious entities.”). 
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approach, the court makes an initial inquiry to determine whether the 
claim can be adjudicated on the basis of generally applicable, secular 
norms, or whether the organization’s religious tenets must be 
examined.113 This approach is highly fact-specific and requires a 
preliminary case-by-case inquiry into whether the claim’s elements 
necessarily implicate the religious doctrine at issue.114 The “true neutral 
principles” approach is faithful to the Supreme Court’s directive in Jones 
v. Wolf that courts refuse to “adopt a rule of compulsory deference.” 
State courts adopting either categorical approach risk neglecting the 
Court’s mandate of careful and reasoned First Amendment analysis. 
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS DECIDING NEGLIGENT 
SUPERVISION CLAIMS AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE RECOGNIZED A BROAD LEVEL 
OF FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY 
In C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima,115 the 
Washington State Supreme Court recognized the viability of negligent 
supervision claims against religious organizations, holding that the 
hierarchical church had a duty to prevent its employees from causing 
harm to foreseeable victims.116 However, two subsequent court of 
appeals cases have rejected similar claims on First Amendment 
grounds.117 This pair of cases, decided in close temporal proximity with 
the state supreme court’s decision in C.J.C., establishes precedent 
instructing lower courts to reject negligent supervision claims against 
religious organizations. 
                                                     
113. See, e.g., Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996) 
(finding no First Amendment bar to a negligent hiring claim because “the court does not inquire into 
the employer’s broad reasons for choosing this particular employee for the position, but instead 
looks to whether the specific danger which ultimately manifested itself could have reasonably been 
foreseen at the time of hiring” (quoting Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1132–33 n.17 (1996))). 
114. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1242 (Miss. 
2005) (allowing negligent supervision claim against religious organization with the caveat that “our 
holding today is not to be blindly applied, allowing in all cases the exercise of jurisdiction over a 
particular cause of action. Rather, each cause of action asserted against a religious organization 
claiming First Amendment protection, must be evaluated according to its particular facts.”).  
115. 138 Wash. 2d 699, 985 P.2d 262 (1999). 
116. Id. at 728, 985 P.2d at 277.  
117. See infra Parts IV.B. and C. 
082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:15 AM 
534 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:517 
 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court Adopted the “True Neutral 
Principles” Approach in C.J.C., Allowing a Negligent Supervision 
Claim Against a Religious Organization 
In C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, the 
Washington State Supreme Court heard three consolidated appeals of 
plaintiffs alleging claims against religious organizations.118 In discussing 
issues specific to one of these cases, Funkhouser v. Wilson, the C.J.C. 
Court held that religious organizations owe a duty of due care to 
foreseeable victims of sexual misconduct by church officials.119 Citing 
the presence of special relationships between the church, the deacon 
performing the alleged acts, and the plaintiffs,120 the state supreme court 
rejected the notion of a categorical bar to the adjudication of negligent 
supervision claims against religious entities.121 Analogizing negligent 
supervision claims against religious organizations to those against school 
districts,122 the Court rejected the church’s First Amendment defense on 
the basis that “to hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious 
leader in a preferred position in our society.”123 The C.J.C. court also 
referred to the Washington State Constitution in rejecting the church’s 
religious freedom argument, but focused its analysis on federal First 
Amendment principles.124 
C.J.C. establishes that religious organizations owe a duty under 
Washington law to prevent harm to foreseeable victims of their 
employees’ torts.125 In rejecting the two categorical approaches to First 
Amendment analysis discussed above,126 C.J.C. represents the Court’s 
                                                     
118. C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 705–07, 985 P.2d at 265–66.  
119. Id. at 727, 985 P.2d at 276 (“We, therefore, conclude [the defendants] owed a duty of 
reasonable care to affirmatively act to prevent the harm, in view of their relationship to the 
plaintiffs, their relationship to [the deacon], and given the knowledge they allegedly possessed.”). 
120. Id.  
121. Id. at 727–28, 985 P.2d at 277 (“The First Amendment does not provide churches with 
absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct.”). 
122. See id. at 723, 985 P.2d at 274 (citing Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995)).  
123. Id. at 728, 985 P.2d at 277 (quoting Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 
336 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also id. at 724, 985 P.2d at 275 (“[W]e simply do not agree with the 
Church that its duty to take protective action was arbitrarily relieved at the church door.”). 
124. See id. at 728, 985 P.2d at 277 (“Similarly, while art. I, § 11 of our state constitution protects 
‘[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,’ that protection ‘shall not be 
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and 
safety of the state.’ Thus, the specific language of art. I, § 11 defeats the Church’s state 
constitutional claims.”). 
125. Id. at 727, 985 P.2d at 276. 
126. See supra Part III. 
082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:15 AM 
2010] STAYING NEUTRAL 535 
 
adoption of the “true neutral principles” approach.127 Provided that the 
employment and control elements of negligent supervision claims can be 
determined without reference to church doctrine, the elements of 
knowledge and proximate cause are questions of fact properly decided 
by a jury.128 A parallel line of Washington appellate cases, however, has 
employed broad language in affirming grants of summary judgment to 
religious organizations, such that Washington law arguably now 
recognizes a de facto First Amendment bar to negligent supervision 
claims against religious entities, in direct conflict with C.J.C. 
B. In Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church, the Washington Court of 
Appeals Applied Establishment Clause Language in Finding a 
Negligent Supervision Claim Barred by the First Amendment 
In Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church,129 the Washington Court of 
Appeals considered the claims of three female parishioners against 
Pullman Baptist Church and its former pastor David Leach.130 The three 
women were members of the church who had received counseling from 
Pastor Leach during the 1980s, and each alleged that he had engaged in 
improper sexual conduct during the course of the counseling 
relationship.131 In addition to claims for breach of fiduciary duty against 
the pastor, the women asserted a negligent supervision claim against the 
church, alleging that the church had been negligent in retaining the 
pastor after having notice that he posed a risk of harm to parishioners.132 
The Germain trial court granted summary judgment to the church for 
two reasons.133 First, it found the plaintiffs’ claim against the church to 
be time-barred.134 Second, the court held that by asserting a negligent 
supervision claim against a religious organization, the plaintiffs had not 
                                                     
127. See supra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
128. See C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 727, 985 P.2d at 276 (“Whether there was a causal connection 
between the harm and the fact of Wilson’s position in the Church, or whether the risk of harm was 
or should have been reasonably foreseen at the time the harm occurred, are questions of fact to be 
determined by the jury.”). 
129. 96 Wash. App. 826, 980 P.2d 809 (1999), review denied, 139 Wash. 2d 1026, 994 P.2d 844 
(2000). 
130. Id. at 828, 980 P.2d at 810.  
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. at 829, 980 P.2d at 810–11. The trial court also found the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim against the pastor barred by the statute of limitations, and granted him summary judgment. Id. 
134. Id. 
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stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.135 Despite evidence 
that church authorities had knowledge of Pastor Leach’s predatory 
conduct,136 the trial court held that both fashioning a standard of care for 
the pastor’s work (duty element) and determining whether the church 
was responsible for supervising the pastor (employment element) would 
violate the First Amendment.137 
The court of appeals issued its judgment just two days before the 
Washington State Supreme Court decided C.J.C.138 Framing its inquiry 
as whether the court should “recognize a cause of action for a church’s 
negligent supervision of a pastor,” the court affirmed both of the trial 
court’s holdings.139 Because the church constitution provided that the 
pastor was to be hired or fired by a majority vote of the congregation, 
the court found that determining whether the church had authority over 
Pastor Leach would require the impermissible interpretation of church 
doctrine.140 In reaching this determination, the court discussed the 
religious doctrine implicated by the employment element, concluding 
that 
[i]n this case, the authority, as the pastor’s employer, belongs to 
all of the Church’s members, who must act by majority rule if 
they are to discharge him or otherwise control his conduct. The 
determination of whether to impose liability on a church where 
the authority is so diffused would require the court to consider 
and interpret the church’s laws and constitution.141 
By discussing the relevant religious doctrine implicated by the elements 
of the plaintiff’s claim, the court seemed to make a preliminary 
determination regarding whether the case could be adjudicated based on 
neutral principles of law.142 But in explaining its refusal to subject the 
church to tort liability, the court refers not to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf or to neutral principles analysis, but 
instead to cases from Wisconsin and Maine for the proposition that “[t]o 
                                                     
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 835–36, 980 P.2d at 814. 
137. Id. at 829, 980 P.2d at 811. 
138. Germain was decided on July 27, 1999, and C.J.C. was decided on July 29, 1999 and 
amended September 8, 1999. See Germain, 96 Wash. App. 826, 980 P.2d 809; C.J.C. v. Corp. of the 
Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 729, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (1999). 
139. Germain, 96 Wash. App. at 835, 980 P.2d at 814 (emphasis added). 
140. See id. at 836, 980 P.2d at 814 (“The congregation chooses the pastor at a meeting called by 
the board of deacons” and the church “constitution also provides that the congregation, by a vote of 
at least 51 percent, may terminate the pastor.”).  
141. Id. at 837, 980 P.2d at 815. 
142. See supra Part II.B. 
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do so would violate the First Amendment by entangling the judiciary 
with religion.”143 The Germain court’s use of the word “entanglement” 
suggests that it is analyzing the claim under Establishment Clause 
doctrine144—language that is wholly absent from the state supreme 
court’s decision in C.J.C. Though Germain was decided prior to the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in C.J.C., and seems at 
odds with C.J.C.’s holding, it remains “good law” and was discussed in 
the next Washington Court of Appeals negligent supervision case 
involving a religious organization.145 
C. In S.H.C. v. Lu, the Washington Court of Appeals Again Employed 
Broad Establishment Clause Language in Refusing to Hear a 
Negligent Supervision Claim 
The Washington Court of Appeals again considered the interaction of 
negligent supervision claims and the First Amendment three years later 
in S.H.C. v. Lu.146 S.H.C., an adult woman, asserted various claims 
against the Ling Shen Ching Tze Temple, Inc. (“Temple”) based on 
sexual acts committed by the temple’s leader, Grandmaster Sheng-Yen 
Lu (“Grandmaster Lu”).147 After several years as a parishioner at the 
Temple, S.H.C. visited Grandmaster Lu to receive healing blessings for 
her chronic headaches.148 Grandmaster Lu informed S.H.C. that not only 
did she suffer from headaches, but that she was also “near death,” a fate 
he could deter with his special “Twin Body Blessing.”149 Grandmaster 
Lu’s “‘blessing’ was, in fact, sexual intercourse,” a ruse he successfully 
perpetrated for over two years.150 
The trial court granted the Temple summary judgment on all claims 
against it,151 and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the First 
Amendment barred S.H.C.’s negligent supervision claim.152 Just as in 
                                                     
143. Germain, 96 Wash. App. at 837, 980 P.2d at 815 (emphasis added) (citing L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Wis. 1997); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441 
(Me. 1997)). 
144. See supra Part II.A.ii. 
145. See S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 520, 54 P.3d 174, 178 (2002) (describing Germain 
as decided “at about the same time as the C.J.C. decision.”). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 515, 54 P.3d at 175.  
148. Id. at 515, 54 P.3d at 175. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 515, 54 P.3d at 176. 
151. Id. at 516, 54 P.3d at 176. 
152. Id. at 518, 54 P.3d at 177. 
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Germain, the record contained considerable evidence that Temple 
leaders were aware of Grandmaster Lu’s sexual relationship with 
S.H.C.,153 and that Temple officials had a sufficient degree of authority 
over Grandmaster Lu to create genuine issues of fact regarding the 
presence of an employment relationship.154 Distinguishing C.J.C., the 
court explained that to determine whether the Temple was negligent in 
its supervision of Grandmaster Lu would require the interpretation of 
religious doctrine, which would “excessively entangle the court with 
religion.”155 The S.H.C. court also distinguished C.J.C. on the basis of 
the age of the plaintiffs, citing the C.J.C. court’s reference to the state 
legislature’s “strong public policies” in support of preventing the sexual 
abuse of children.156 
In addition to this broad Establishment Clause justification, the court 
ostensibly performed a Jones v. Wolf analysis, finding that there were 
“no neutral principles of law governing this case that would permit a 
civil court to resolve the question of liability against the Temple.”157 In 
describing why the case necessarily required interpretation of religious 
doctrine, the court discussed the religious principles of Grandmaster 
Lu’s True Buddha School in detail.158 Followers of the Temple “regard 
Grandmaster Lu as a Living Buddha—one to whom they have an 
obligation of obedience.”159 Furthermore, Temple doctrine requires 
followers to “‘see only good qualities in [Grandmaster Lu], and never 
any faults,’” and dictates that “‘one should not criticize or slander the 
former Guru.’”160 The court reasoned that because of the extreme 
obedience and deference required of Temple followers, adjudicating the 
plaintiff’s claim would necessarily require rulings on matters beyond the 
scope of proper judicial inquiry.161 
In making its neutral principles finding, however, the court framed the 
                                                     
153. See id. at 518, 54 P.3d at 177 (“S.H.C. testified that Temple officials were aware that her 
interactions with Grandmaster Lu were ‘out of the ordinary or unacceptable for interactions by 
followers . . . . This evidence is sufficient to create a factual issue that the Temple was on notice of 
Grandmaster Lu’s activities, subject only to the question of whether the factual issue is material for 
summary judgment purposes.”). 
154. See id. (“S.H.C. did introduce evidence that the Temple officials had the authority to exclude 
Grandmaster Lu from the Temple grounds.”).  
155. Id. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179. 
156. Id. at 521, 54 P.3d at 178–79. 
157. Id. at 523, 54 P.3d at 179.  
158. Id. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179. 
159. Id.  
160. Id. (emphasis in original). 
161. Id. at 522–23, 54 P.3d at 179. 
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negligence standard as requiring the court to develop an impermissible 
“reasonable religious organization standard”162 and evaluate “the truth of 
the above beliefs.”163 The court stated that “there is danger that the 
standard would vary, for example, from a ‘reasonable Protestant’ 
standard, a ‘reasonable Catholic’ standard, or a ‘reasonable Islamic’ 
standard.”164 In performing its neutral principles analysis, the S.H.C. 
court focused on whether the relevant religious doctrine would 
necessarily “entangle” it with religion; under a “true neutral principles” 
analysis, the court would focus on whether the elements of the claim 
necessarily implicate religious doctrine.165 
V. WHEN NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CLAIMS CAN BE 
DECIDED ON NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, 
WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD ADJUDICATE THEM 
The Germain and S.H.C. courts’ use of Establishment Clause 
language and focus on religious doctrine creates broad First Amendment 
protection for religious organizations defending negligent supervision 
claims. These cases should be read as limited to their factual 
circumstances both (1) to avoid violating the Establishment Clause and 
(2) to preserve an essential legal mechanism for the remedy and 
prevention of sexual misconduct. To this end, Washington courts should 
also articulate a clear statement of the appropriate neutral principles 
analysis, refrain from discussing Establishment Clause principles, and 
focus the preliminary inquiry solely on the elements of the plaintiff’s 
claim. 
A. Germain and S.H.C. Create an Overbroad Level of First 
Amendment Protection for Religious Entities and Should Be Read 
Narrowly 
Taken together, Germain and S.H.C. create an overbroad First 
Amendment protection for religious entities defending negligent 
supervision claims. By cloaking its analysis in the mantle of “excessive 
entanglement,”166 the Germain court gives credence to the notion that 
                                                     
162. Id. at 523, 54 P.3d at 179. 
163. Id. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179. 
164. Id. at 523, 54 P.3d at 179. 
165. See supra Part II.B (discussing the United States Supreme Court’s neutral principles analysis 
in Jones v. Wolf). 
166. Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church, 96 Wash. App. 826, 835, 980 P.2d 809, 814 (1999). 
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the Establishment Clause categorically bars negligent supervision claims 
against religious entities. This doctrinal signal discourages lower courts 
from applying tort principles against religious organizations because, 
unlike the case-by-case neutral principles analysis of Jones v. Wolf, the 
Establishment Clause functions to categorically prohibit certain types of 
government action.167 Though the Germain court claimed to refrain from 
deciding “whether the First Amendment forecloses all negligent 
supervision claims against churches based on the conduct of their 
ministers,”168 its ruling may have effectively done so. The S.H.C. court 
also employed Establishment Clause language in rejecting the plaintiff’s 
negligent supervision claim, creating further precedent that suggests 
such claims are categorically barred. This is precisely the type of First 
Amendment shield denounced in Jones v. Wolf.169 By employing the 
rhetoric both of the Establishment Clause and of Jones v. Wolf only to 
summarily declare S.H.C.’s claim “barred by the First Amendment,”170 
the S.H.C. court expedited Washington courts’ drift towards a 
categorical immunity regime. 
The S.H.C. court took this immunity one step further by focusing its 
inquiry on the nature of the Temple’s doctrine and framing the 
negligence standard as that of the “reasonable religious organization.”171 
The proper Jones v. Wolf analysis focuses on the elements of the cause 
of action instead of the doctrine of the affected religion;172 consequently, 
the proper standard of care for the duty owed to foreseeable victims 
recognized under C.J.C. should be that of the “reasonable employer.”173 
By phrasing the inquiry in S.H.C. as pertaining to the truth or conviction 
behind the Temple’s belief, and not simply as whether the officials 
should have reasonably known of Grandmaster Lu’s misconduct,174 the 
court decided the case within an analytical framework that will prevent 
civil courts from hearing such claims.175 In essence, the S.H.C. court 
                                                     
167. See supra Part II.A.ii. 
168. Germain, 96 Wash. App. at 836–37, 980 P.2d at 815 (emphasis in original). 
169. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (“We cannot agree, however, that the First 
Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in 
resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.”). 
170. S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 523, 54 P.3d 174, 179 (2002). 
171. Id. 
172. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
173. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 727, 985 P.2d 262, 
276 (1999). 
174. S.H.C., 113 Wash. App. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179. 
175. The S.H.C. court’s concern that applying this “reasonable religious organization” standard to 
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found that the case could not be decided on neutral principles of law 
because it looked only at religious principles.176 
Similarly, the court’s attempt to distinguish C.J.C. on the basis of the 
plaintiff’s age is unfounded.177 The court in C.J.C. identified the policy 
of protecting children from sexual abuse as one supporting its 
decision,178 but did not state that its holding was limited to cases of child 
sexual abuse.179 Courts applying S.H.C. have seized upon this 
distinction, characterizing S.H.C. as “conclud[ing] there was no similar 
special relationship between a church leader and an adult.”180 This 
artificial distinction creates a broad religious immunity from negligent 
supervision claims made by adults, and greatly expands the First 
Amendment protection that Germain and S.H.C. create. 
Several cases following S.H.C. have embraced this broad immunity 
and cursorily dismissed negligent supervision claims against religious 
organizations on First Amendment grounds.181 Because the Washington 
State Supreme Court has not reviewed this line of cases,182 it is now 
more difficult for a plaintiff to recover on a negligent supervision theory 
                                                     
religious organizations might result in impermissible variation is well-founded, see Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that “[t]he First Amendment mandates governmental 
neutrality between religion and religion . . .”), but this problem stems from the court’s framing of 
the negligence standard, and not from the underlying facts of the case. 
176. This is not to say that the Germain and S.H.C. courts necessarily reached the wrong result. 
In Germain, the congregation’s “majority rules” approach to control of the pastor indicates that 
determination of the authority issue might have required interpretation of church doctrine. See supra 
notes 140–141 and accompanying text. Similarly, in S.H.C., allowing a jury to decide whether the 
Temple leaders had knowledge of Grandmaster Lu’s misconduct might in essence have required 
them to evaluate the verity of the officials’ professed belief in Lu’s infallibility. See supra notes 
159–161 and accompanying text. However, paired with its repeated use of Establishment Clause 
language, the court’s ultimate disposition of the issue creates the impression that such claims are 
categorically barred. In this respect, S.H.C. and Germain may be examples of the adage “hard cases 
make bad law.” 
177. S.H.C., 113 Wash. App. at 521, 54 P.3d at 178–79. 
178. C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 726, 985 P.2d. at 276. 
179. Id. at 727, 985 P.2d at 276–77 (“We caution that our holding is limited . . . . [We] do hold 
that where a special protective relationship exists, a principal may not turn a blind eye to a known or 
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm posed by its agents toward those it would otherwise be required 
to protect simply because the injury is arbitrarily perpetrated off premises or after-hours.”). 
180. Rose v. Seventh Day Adventists, No. 53424-6-I, 2005 WL 1300805, at *7 n.13 (2005).  
181. See, e.g., id. at *5 (citing S.H.C. in dismissing claims against church for negligently 
retaining and supervising pastor who failed to warn victim of murder conspiracy); Elvig v. Ackles, 
123 Wash. App. 491, 98 P.3d 524 (2004) (rejecting negligent supervision claim on First 
Amendment grounds). 
182. See S.H.C. v. Lu, 149 Wash. 2d. 1011, 69 P.3d 874 (2003) (denying review); Germain v. 
Pullman Baptist Church, 139 Wash. 2d. 1026, 994 P.2d 844 (2000) (denying review). 
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against a religious organization in Washington State.183 Courts asked to 
hear negligent supervision claims against religious organizations should 
read Germain and S.H.C. as examples of cases barred because of their 
unique factual circumstances, and not as representing the proposition 
that all such claims contravene the First Amendment. 
B. Religious Organizations Should Not Have Broad Immunity Against 
Negligent Supervision Claims 
There are two prominent reasons why Germain and S.H.C. should be 
read as limited to their particular facts. First, providing religious 
organizations with an overbroad level of protection risks violating the 
Establishment Clause. Second, negligent supervision is an essential 
mechanism for providing remedy to victims of clergy sexual misconduct 
and incentivizing religious organizations to prevent such conduct. 
1. Providing Religious Organizations with an Overbroad Level of 
Protection Violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment 
The competing nature of the First Amendment’s two religion 
clauses184 requires courts hearing claims against religious organizations 
to apply a careful, reasoned approach when determining whether a First 
Amendment bar exists. Such analyses typically focus on Free Exercise 
Clause principles and question whether placing liability on the religious 
entity will unduly restrict the organization’s constitutionally protected 
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, however, requires an 
equally important consideration; courts focusing only on Free Exercise 
Clause principles may go to such lengths to avoid impinging on the 
organization’s religious freedom that they impermissibly favor religion 
over secular interests.185 
The notion that courts can impermissibly “establish” religion through 
overprotection can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s discussion in 
Reynolds v. U.S., where Justice Waite observed that to permit religious 
beliefs to trump generally applicable legal norms “would be to make the 
                                                     
183. See, e.g., Rose, 2005 WL 1300805, at *5 (describing S.H.C. as “controlling” and holding 
that “[i]n order to find liability of the Defendants, I would have to ‘entangle {myself} in the 
religious percepts and beliefs’ of the Seventh Day Adventist religion and its practices”); Elvig, 123 
Wash. App. at 498–99, 98 P.3d at 528.  
184. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.  
185. See supra Part II.A.ii (demonstrating that the Establishment Clause prohibits state laws that 
either inhibit or advance religious practice).   
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professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”186 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Employment Division v. 
Smith187 and City of Boerne,188 noting that recognizing overbroad First 
Amendment protection for religiously based conduct would create an 
“anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of 
general applicability.”189 The perils of such an approach are manifold, as 
individuals could potentially concoct religious doctrines shielding them 
from any conceivable type of liability.190 Similarly, the Washington 
State Supreme Court has recognized that overbroad Free Exercise 
Clause protections would “impermissibly place a religious leader in a 
preferred position in our society.”191 Regardless of whether the Pullman 
Baptist Church or Ling Shen Chin Tze Temple should have received 
First Amendment protection, the Germain and S.H.C. courts’ imprecise 
neutral principles analyses create precedent for lower courts to exempt 
religious organizations from claims of negligent supervision. This 
precedent is at odds with the general First Amendment shift towards 
neutrality192 and risks creating an impermissible “law respecting an 
establishment of religion” by placing religious organizations on a higher 
plane than nonreligious entities. 
2. Negligent Supervision Is an Essential Mechanism for Remedying 
and Preventing Sexual Misconduct by Religious Leaders 
Victims of clergy sexual misconduct can seek redress for the lasting 
psychological and emotional injuries they incur by filing tort claims 
against religious leaders, or against the religious organizations 
employing those leaders. Powerful reasons exist for holding religious 
organizations liable for the torts of their employees. First, while religious 
leaders typically have modest incomes and reside in homes owned by 
                                                     
186. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878); see also supra note 65 and accompanying 
text. 
187. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
188. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
189. Id. at 513. 
190. See, e.g., Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (“It is easy to envision the 
kinds of ‘anomalies’ that could result from such an absolutist interpretation of the free exercise 
clause. For example, laws prohibiting murder would have no application to human sacrifices 
performed pursuant to some religious practice.”). 
191. C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 728, 985 P.2d 262, 
277 (1999) (quoting Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998)).  
192. See supra Part II.A.i. 
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the organization,193 making them immune from significant judgments, 
religious organizations are frequently more capable of fulfilling a 
judgment debt. Allowing successful plaintiffs to collect from religious 
entities’ “deeper pockets” offers victims of sexual misconduct a clear 
remedial advantage. Furthermore, because religious organizations are 
often in the best position to prevent sexual misconduct by their 
leaders,194 placing liability for clergy sexual misconduct on the 
organization itself incentivizes the entity to take affirmative steps to 
protect its members. 
Those injured by clergy sexual misconduct can seek redress against 
religious organizations through three main legal theories: breach of 
fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, and negligent employment. Of these 
options, negligent employment actions often represent the only viable 
remedy because courts are extremely reluctant to hear breach of 
fiduciary duty claims against religious organizations,195 and vicarious 
liability actions almost always fail because sexual misconduct rarely 
arises in contexts within the scope of an employee’s duties.196 Within the 
negligent employment torts, negligent hiring actions are similarly 
doomed because they equate to “negligent ordination” suits requiring the 
court to examine the “internal” religious policies of the organization.197 
Thus, negligent supervision becomes an essential remedial mechanism 
for victims of sexual misconduct by religious leaders, providing a 
broader background duty that plaintiffs can fall back on when breach of 
fiduciary duty or respondeat superior claims fail. In order for 
Washington courts to effectively remedy and prevent the sexual 
misconduct of religious leaders, they should not reject negligent 
supervision claims based on an overbroad conception of First 
Amendment protection. 
                                                     
193. See United States Census Bureau, Earnings By Occupation and Education, Sep. 21, 2009, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/earnings/call2usboth.html (listing 1999 median full-time 
year-round clergy income as $31,285). 
194. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 1 (citing lack of oversight as a cause of sexual misconduct by 
religious leaders). 
195. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1835–36 (“A number of courts have dismissed on the 
pleadings such claims against religious institutions on the theory that the defendant religious 
organization and its representatives have not undertaken any special duties with respect to each and 
every adherent of the faith.”). 
196. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.  
197. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1846 (“As far as we can tell, no court has permitted a 
plaintiff to proceed on a claim that an institution negligently prepared or ordained a candidate for 
ministry.”). 
082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:15 AM 
2010] STAYING NEUTRAL 545 
 
C. Washington Courts Should Clarify Their Neutral Principles 
Analysis and Reaffirm the Viability of Negligent Supervision 
Claims Against Religious Organizations 
In order to avoid granting an overbroad level of protection to religious 
organizations through an expansive reading of Germain and S.H.C., 
Washington courts should articulate an explicit statement of the 
appropriate First Amendment analysis. This articulation should be 
consistent with the duty to prevent foreseeable harms recognized by the 
state supreme court in C.J.C. Current case law gives imprecise direction 
to lower courts asked to evaluate the viability of such claims, and creates 
little incentive for religious organizations to prevent sexual misconduct 
by their leaders. The correct analytical framework would discard any 
mention of Establishment Clause doctrine and focus solely on the 
question of whether it would be possible to determine the specific 
elements of the claim based solely on neutral principles of law. 
Under the “true neutral principles” analysis exemplified by cases like 
Florida’s Malicki v. Doe198 and C.J.C., courts must make a preliminary 
determination of whether adjudicating the specific elements of the 
plaintiff’s claim would require the interpretation of religious doctrine. 
This analysis should not be phrased as an examination of the verity of 
religious doctrine, as in S.H.C.,199 because such inquiries will always 
contravene the First Amendment. Rather, courts should look only at the 
elements of the tort and determine whether an organization’s conduct 
can be evaluated without reference to religious doctrine. In many 
instances, courts will be able to evaluate an organization’s conduct in 
purely secular terms, and the Free Exercise Clause will not bar a 
plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim. The muddled analyses of 
Germain and S.H.C. form confusing precedent for lower courts asked to 
hear these claims, and create a significant risk that these claims will be 
unjustifiably rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Sexual misconduct by religious leaders is a prominent problem in 
American society, and the tort of negligent supervision is an essential 
mechanism both for preventing it and for remedying the harm it causes. 
                                                     
198. Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also supra notes 111–114 and 
accompanying text.  
199. S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 523, 54 P.3d 174, 179 (2002); see also supra notes 171–
176 and accompanying text.  
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In C.J.C, the Washington State Supreme Court acknowledged the 
viability of negligent supervision claims against religious organizations. 
However, two subsequent Washington Court of Appeals cases have 
rejected similar claims on vague First Amendment grounds, leaving the 
status of the state’s law unclear and prone to overprotection of religious 
entities. To remedy this overbroad level of First Amendment protection, 
Washington courts should adopt a clear statement of the criteria through 
which they evaluate First Amendment defenses to neutral laws of 
general applicability. The appropriate analysis requires a preliminary 
examination of whether elements of the particular case can be decided 
solely on neutral principles of law, or whether the elements themselves 
necessarily implicate religious doctrine. By articulating the proper 
analytical framework for evaluating whether courts can permissibly 
adjudicate negligent supervision claims against religious organizations, 
Washington courts will both provide a remedy for the serious and lasting 
injuries of plaintiffs, and create an incentive for religious organizations 
to prevent the foreseeable harms perpetrated by their leaders. 
 
